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TIME: Almanac 1993
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1992-09-23
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BUSINESS, Page 58Churning in the Shark Tank
A founder of mighty KKR accuses the firm of dirty dealing
They set up shop quietly in 1976 with just $3 million in
capital, but within a decade they became a revolutionary force
on Wall Street. By last year the leveraged-buyout firm founded
by Jerome Kohlberg Jr., Henry Kravis and George Roberts seemed
virtually invincible. The firm's crowning achievement was last
December's $25 billion buyout of RJR Nabisco, the biggest
takeover deal in history. The firm's victory transformed Henry
Kravis, with his slicked-back hair, Savile Row suits and
socialite wife (clothing designer Carolyne Roehm), into Wall
Street's pre-eminent symbol of power and panache. In its short
history, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts has acquired three dozen
companies (estimated total cost: more than $60 billion), 13 of
which the firm still controls.
But now KKR's luster is being tarnished by the greed and
backbiting that have become legendary in the world of high
finance. Last week it was disclosed that Kohlberg, who left KKR
two years ago but retained a financial interest in the firm, has
filed suit in New York Supreme Court against his partners. He
accuses them of illegally appropriating part of his share of the
profits and suggests that other investors may also have been
deprived of their rewards. The legal battle could be fierce.
Said a leading corporate raider: "You're going to find them
devouring each other. It's clearly going to be a suicide mission
for both sides."
Even before the suit was filed, KKR faced unexpected
problems. In the past month two of the firms that it helped
acquire in leveraged buyouts said they were unable to make
payments on their debt. In the wake of these setbacks, Wall
Street dealmakers are asking what was once an unthinkable
question: If KKR's investors become spooked, will the firm's
gushing money pipeline dry up? Kravis and Roberts responded to
the suit with a prepared statement: "We are saddened that Mr.
Kohlberg felt it necessary to sue . . . We believe he is wrong
both as to the facts and his interpretation of the agreement
between us."
KKR's patriarch, Kohlberg, 64, acted as tutor to Kravis and
Roberts from the early '70s, when the two cousins worked for
him at the Bear Stearns investment firm. As co-head of the
corporate-finance department, Kohlberg, along with his
proteges, pioneered some of the first LBO deals. After leaving
to form their own firm, t$hey initially arranged buyouts of
unglamorous heavy-industry companies. All went smoothly until
the mid-'80s, when a generation gap emerged. Kravis and Roberts,
19 years younger than their mentor, saw hostile deals as the
future of the business. Kohlberg balked and in 1987 left the
firm over "philosophical differences." His severance contract
stipulated that his share of the firm's profits on all future
deals would gradually decline, from 20.5% in 1987 to 7% in 1995.
Now Kohlberg charges his partners with breaching that
contract. Kravis and Roberts, he argues, plotted to wrongfully
reduce his share in KKR deals by transforming "old" deals into
"new" ones through a series of refinancings. In one case, the
1981 acquisition of a manufacturing firm called Marley, Kohlberg
says, his share of the profits was unfairly slashed last year,
from 32% to 17.6%.
In a statement, Kohlberg declared that he "took this step
with extreme reluctance." But some Wall Street investors suggest
that Kohlberg was all too quick to sue over a partnership
squabble. Says money manager Pierre Rinfret, who heads a firm
bearing his name: "Kohlberg wants something, and he feels that
the only way to get it is to threaten to ruin his former
partners' reputation."
The most provocative aspect of Kohlberg's suit is its
implication that other investors in KKR deals may also have got
burned. Beginning in 1986, Kohlberg alleges, KKR decided that
it would boost its stake in some of its acquisitions by buying
out its investors at prices far below what they might have
commanded if the companies had been sold to outsiders in the
open market. (By this time, KKR general partners included Robert
MacDonnell and Paul Raether.) Kohlberg suggests that the KKR
partners assumed complete control of their acquisitions with the
intention of selling the properties and pocketing huge profits
on their own.
Kohlberg may be speaking for other unhappy investors in
KKR's deals who feel that the company has become too greedy and
aggressive. To some deal-makers outside the firm, KKR's
escalating fees seem unconscionable: $60 million for the $5.3
billion 1986 acquisition of the Safeway supermarket chain, $75
million for the RJR Nabisco buyout.
While most of KKR's acquisitions have paid impressive
returns to its investors, some of its smaller holdings are
struggling. Last month Nashville's SCI Television, 45% owned by
KKR, disclosed it would be unable to make its Sept. 30 debt
payment. Soon afterward, Seaman Furniture of New York, which KKR
acquired in 1987, missed a payment on its debt obligations.
Seaman's auditor suggested that the company might not survive
as a going concern.
Even so, KKR's second biggest buyout, the $6 billion
takeover of Beatrice in 1986, has paid handsome returns. KKR's
partners nearly doubled their original investment of $402
million, collecting $783 million within 15 months of the deal's
completion. While the payback on the RJR Nabisco deal is still
uncertain, KKR has succeeded in reducing the firm's debt load
by selling off more than $2.5 billion in assets.
Kohlberg's lawsuit may inspire KKR's investors to drive
harder bargains with the firm. But Kravis and Roberts have not
come this far through meekness or contrition. As they battle
their former mentor and fight to preserve KKR's power, the
spectacle is likely to throw light on some intriguing details
about a secretive company and its powerful leaders.